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Sailing the Seas of Cheese*
  Erik Anderson 
Abstract
Memphis Elvis is cool; Vegas Elvis is cheesy. How come? To
call something cheesy is, ostensibly, to disparage it, and yet
cheesy acts are some of the most popular in popular culture
today. How is this possible? The concepts of cheese, cheesy,
and cheesiness play an important and increasingly ubiquitous
role in popular culture today. I offer an analysis of these
concepts, distinguishing them from nearby concepts like kitchy
and campy. Along the way I draw attention to the important
roles of cultural/historical context, background knowledge, and
especially artist’s intentions as they are relevant to aesthetic
assessments involving cheese and related concepts. I go on to
contend that these concepts, properly understood, serve as
helpful test cases concerning some important issues in
contemporary aesthetics, such as the paradox of negative art
and the contentious debate between intentionalists and anti-
intentionalists.
Key Words
anti-intentionalism, camp, cheesiness, kitsch, high art,
intention, intentionalism, low art, paradox of negative art,
performance, popular culture
1. Introduction
It would be difficult to understand many aesthetic assessments
in popular culture these days without a good grasp of the
concepts of cheese, cheesy and cheesiness. Part of the reason
is that the high art/low art distinction upon which aesthetic
assessments depend in the modern tradition following Hume
and Kant is not operative within contemporary popular
culture.[1] It would be a bit too strong to assert that there are
no sets of “disproportionate pairs”[2] of artworks at all to
serve as standards by which to orient our aesthetic
assessments. But this is precisely what makes the concept of
cheese useful, and that is perhaps what explains its ubiquity.
Cheesiness is relative, and the conditions for applying the term
are subjective in just the right way to make it useful in a sea
of relativity. My hope is that by shedding light on the nature of
cheese and cheesiness, we will, indirectly, shed light on what
it is for a work to be good art in contemporary popular
culture.[3]
Consider an initial example. Bill Murray’s subtly brilliant bad
lounge singer skits from early Saturday Night Live episodes
are a beautiful parody of cheesy hotel-lounge entertainment.
But Murray’s act itself is not cheesy at all. Rather, it is a
parody of the cheese or cheesiness of bad lounge acts found
across the United States but probably most often associated
with the ones found in Las Vegas and Atlantic City. There is
something embarrassing, perhaps painful, and almost
contemptible about such acts, even though they are
completely and utterly harmless. They are harmless, and yet
the parody works because of a shared sense of derision we
direct toward the targets: real lounge acts. On the way out of
a hotel hosting such a real act we might advise people on the
way in: “Whatever you do, don’t go near the lounge. The
singer in there is the biggest cheeseball we’ve ever seen.”
Cheese abounds in popular culture. Consider a few obvious
examples: Celine Dion’s over the top big-tent Vegas act that
sold out nightly for over three years from 2003-7; much of
what appears on “American Idol,” the most popular show on
American television; as well as just about anything by Barry
Manilow, Pat Boone, Michael Bolton, and Kenny G, just to
name a precious few. And cheese isn’t restricted to music.
Cheese and cheesiness appear in all forms of popular culture:
music, movies, books, painting, photography, sculpture and
architecture—and this list is certainly not exhaustive. Examples
might include a pandering political speech, a gold chain on a
hairy chest, the Rock and Roll McDonald’s in Chicago, some
Anne Geddes works, many Hallmark greeting cards, special
effects in some movies, precious photos of cute little baby
tigers wearing hats, and so on and so forth.
The purely aesthetic senses of ‘cheese,’ ‘ cheesy’ and
‘cheesiness’ which I’m interested in are distinct from some
other perhaps related senses of the terms. So distinguish this
sense of ‘cheese’ from some others. For example, someone
might say, “Wipe that cheesy grin off your face.” to indicate
mock-disapproval of but wry appreciation for a shared in-joke.
Of course one might also use that same expression to indicate
genuine disapproval for an inauthentic or disingenuous smile.
I’ve heard the term used in another alternative sense as well:
“Cover up those cheesy legs; you’re blinding us!”  This is an
aesthetic sense of the term, but not the one I’ll be addressing
here. 
Use of the term ‘cheesy’ is widening rapidly. Witness an
editorial in the New York Times on October 16, 2008:
The nation still doesn’t know the full extent of President
Bush’s obsession with eavesdropping on citizens, but
here’s a cheesy new aspect: Phone calls home from
American soldiers, aid workers and journalists in Iraq
were reported to have been tapped and stored by
military agents supposedly searching for terrorist
intelligence leads.
I’m not even sure that this is a legitimate sense of the term
‘cheesy,’ but in any case it is not the sense of the term I’m
interested in. Further examples will help to clarify this point.
A more legitimate use of the concept and one much closer to
the sense of the term I have in mind appeared in USA Today
just after the election of Barack Obama. On the subject of
Senator Claire McCaskill’s early endorsement of Obama:
She was the first female senator to back Obama over
Hillary Clinton. McCaskill said her daughter had pushed
her to take a stand and not be “a cheesy politician
who’s playing it safe.”[4]
A similar use comes from Maureen Dowd, in the New York
Times, November 19, 2008, on involving the Clintons in his
new administration:
Obama is overlooking all his cherished dictums against
drama and leaking and his lofty vetting standards to try
and create a situation where the country can benefit
from the talent of the Clintons while curbing their
cheesy excesses, like their cash flow from foreigners.
The point is fairly clear: cheesy politicians take the easy way
out, securing their position by clinging to what is safe, refusing
to take political risks that might constitute or precipitate
genuine progress. Here is Maureen Dowd again on March 19,
2008:
With the Clintons, we expect them to be cheesy on
ethics, so no one is ever surprised when they are.
These examples shed some light on the seemingly odd use of
the concept in USA Today, which we saw above: Bush’s
obsession with eavesdropping on his own citizens can be seen
as cheesy because a clear violation of civil rights is being
defended, not in some subtle, innovative or even devious way,
but instead by invoking the tired and lame old excuse that “it’s
in the interest of our national security.” Now, that’s cheesy.
It’s not cheesy in the aesthetic sense, but we’re getting there.
Here are some further examples of cheesiness: Pick-up lines
are almost always cheesy. Cheating at video games, or at least
winning unfairly over and over in the same mechanical way is
cheesy. A friend of mine recently complained about how
cheesy it was to hold a tropical-themed wedding reception at
a chain hotel in the Poconos. Similar uses of the concept are
ubiquitous in contemporary popular culture. “Did you see Burt
Reynolds? He still has that cheesy porno mustache.”
Cheese Whiz is cheesy but not in the relevant sense. However,
the contrast with cheese, the dairy product, is instructive. On
the one hand, there is no food product cheesier than Cheese
Whiz. On the other hand, there is nothing about Cheese Whiz
itself that is cheesy in the aesthetic sense. Of course it might
be strikingly cheesy to serve Cheese Whiz at a cocktail party
or something like that, in which case, Cheese Whiz would be
cheesy in both senses of the term. What it is to be cheese in
the former sense is to be a sample of a dairy product of a
certain kind, and what it is to be such a sample is a matter of
its composition. Thus ‘cheesy’ in this sense indicates
something intrinsic; it expresses an intrinsic property. But
what it is to be cheesy in the aesthetic sense is something
relational. Thus to be ‘cheesy’ in the sense I am interested in
is a matter of the possession of a relational property. For this
reason, to someone from a country like France, where much
natural cheese is produced, Cheese Whiz might indeed seem
strikingly cheesy in the relevant sense: as unnecessarily
processed food, almost as a snack packaged for children and
marketed to adults.
Some object’s being cheesy, then, involves, obviously, its
relations to other things that may or may not themselves be
cheesy. Take this piece of ripe Camembert I have in my
pocket. It’s mine; I stole it fair and square from my friend
Philippe, who made it. But it could exist without me, or
Philippe, for that matter. Imagine now a possible world in
which this piece of Camembert exists alone, not just in
Philippe’s and my absence, but all by itself—in a “lonely
world.”[5] This is just a way of saying that the property of
being (a sample of) Camembert cheese is an intrinsic property.
Things are different for the aesthetic sense of ‘cheese’.
Cheesiness of this kind is relational. Something whose intrinsic
properties remained the same might change in its aesthetic
cheesiness depending on its relations to other things. Burt
Reynold’s mustache would not have been cheesy had he lived
in the Civil War era, and it might not even be cheesy today, if
he moved, say, to Baghdad.
Cheesiness is also, obviously, a matter of taste. The popularity
of KISS, Celine Dion and American Idol make this point almost
too obvious to mention. However, although cheesiness is
relational and a matter of taste, change with respect to
cheesiness is still genuine change, and not mere “Cambridge
change,”[6] as they say.
2.  Nearby Concepts
To get a better grip on ‘cheese,’ ‘cheesy’ and ‘cheesiness,’ it
will be helpful to distinguish them from some other some
similar concepts that are easily confused with them.
‘Unpleasant’
People find atonal music unpleasant but none call it cheesy,
unless there are other things about it that make it so aside
from its unpleasantness. So to say that something is cheesy is
not simply to say that we dislike it because we find it
unpleasant. Not all cheese is unpleasant, anyway. Kenny G’s
“Forever in Love” is moderately pleasant.  In fact, it is this
simple or simplistic pleasantness that, in combination with
other things about it, makes it cheesy. Obviously, not
everything unpleasant is cheesy. Dentist office visits are not
cheesy, although the décor found in dentist’s offices certainly
can be.
‘Tacky’
 Something can be tacky without being cheesy. For example,
the use of fluorescent paints in a barroom or a dance hall can
be tacky without being cheesy. During a KISS concert, when
Gene Simmons spits blood out of his mouth, it’s certainly
tacky, but it’s debatable whether it’s cheesy. A choreographer,
set designer, or costume designer might dress his or her
dancers in overly revealing outfits, which we would call tacky
but might not call cheesy. Similarly, something can be cheesy
without being tacky. A cheesy picture of cute, little, cuddling,
baby tigers hung on a dorm room wall is cheesy but it’s not
tacky, unless they are up to something vulgar.
‘Cheap’ or’Chintzy’
We might complain about the cheesiness of some exurban
Mexican restaurant: its frozen margaritas with mini-
sombreros, its gaudy piñatas, red vinyl booths, neon Corona
Beer signs, looping vals mexicanos and wait staff dressed daily
in outfits appropriate only for Cinco de Mayo. Certainly part of
our complaint is that the restaurant is a cheap substitute for
the genuine article, something built out of the easiest and
chintziest stereotypical elements that exurbanites might
associate with Mexico. But although we might want to say that
something is cheesy because it looks poorly constructed or
slapped-together, and hence looks cheap or chintzy, ‘cheesy’
is not synonymous with either ‘cheap’ or ‘chintzy.’ There are
many examples of expensive, bloated-budget films that are
prime examples of Grade A cheese: John Travolta’s Battleship
Earth, a veritable feast of cheese, is a most obvious example.
Nothing stands in the way of producing very expensive cheese.
In fact, and Battleship Earth is a good example of this,
something’s being costly might add to rather than subtract
from its cheesiness.
‘Tasteless’
This is harder.  Judgments about cheesiness are judgments of
taste, and cheesiness is intrinsically derogatory. So to describe
something as cheesy in the aesthetic sense is to charge that
the work, or the performers or producers of the work, are
lacking in taste. But it would be a bit too strong to say that
something’s being cheesy makes it or its producers tasteless.
Similarly, not everything tasteless is cheesy. Sexual jokes can
make a screenplay tasteless without making it cheesy. Andrew
Dice Clay’s act from the 1980s is a good example of tasteless
non-cheese.
‘Trite’
What is trite is commonplace, stale and tired; hackneyed,
corny and clichéd. At least that’s what my Word thesaurus
says. ‘Trite’ is certainly in the immediate neighborhood of
‘cheesy’. But it is too harsh. When Celine Dion breaks into her
“air-guitar” routine, squinting her eyes and pouting her lips in
an attempt to inject emotive force into her performance, the
result is cheesy, certainly, but it would be overly harsh to
describe it as trite. It invites eye-rolling but not the same
derision we direct at something trite like playing “Stairway to
Heaven” in a guitar store.
‘Crass’
For similar reasons, ‘crass’ doesn’t capture what it is to be
cheesy. What is crass is insensitive and is typically morally
objectionable. The guy who insists on injecting, “That’s what
she said,” at every opening in a conversation is being crass,
not cheesy. Cheesiness is harmless, although objectionable for
other reasons. The cute little baby tigers on the dorm room
wall are cheesy but not crass because there isn’t really
anything insensitive or morally objectionable about them.
‘Schlock’
People say that ‘schlock’ is the Yiddish term for cheese. I can’t
claim any kind of authority here, but this doesn’t seem to be
quite right. ‘Schlock’ implies sloppiness in construction.  This is
sometimes the case with cheese too. But it need not be;
cheese can be very carefully crafted. Again, Kenny G is a great
example of very carefully handcrafted, Grade-A Cheese. So
something might be cheesy and yet fail to be schlocky.
‘Schlock Rock’ which applies to “Hair Metal” bands of the
1980s, such as Poison and Winger, as well as to contemporary
acts modeled after the originals, provides a good example of
the ground on which the two concepts converge: the big hair,
the spandex, the three-power-chord-progressions, the
fluorescent guitars with the acute angles, the smoke, the
pyrotechnics, the towering banks of amplifiers, the twenty-
five-piece drum kit . . . .it’s all too much to take seriously, and
this is surely some of the appeal. Aesthetic and artistic quality
are sacrificed in order to make room for the grossly over-the-
top presentation.
‘Corny’
The concept of corniness is obviously very close to the concept
of ‘cheesiness.’ First of all, there is the food connection, and
there is certainly an overlap in application of the two concepts.
What is cornball might just as well be described as cheeseball.
In some cases, the two terms are interchangeable: corny
special effects are cheesy special effects. Yet ‘corny’ might
have an application to certain cheap and silly jokes that
wouldn’t typically be termed ‘cheesy’. The former is more
playful than the latter, and the latter implies an inauthenticity
not part of corniness. A speech at a wedding reception might
be corny because of its sentimentality or silly humor but fail to
be cheesy because the sentiment or humor involved is not
invoked for manipulative effect.
‘Cliché’
A natural suggestion might be that we react negatively to
cheesy art because “it’s so 1999.”[7] But cheesy isn’t the
same as cliché either. Consider the contrast between cool
Memphis Elvis and cheesy Vegas Elvis. The problem with the
rhinestones and the bellbottoms and the giant collars and the
throwing of the sweaty scarves isn’t that it’s so 1950s. We
don’t say, “I can’t believe Elvis wheeled out that old chestnut
of an act.” The act is cheesy but not cliché. Of course someone
who covers his Vegas-era act now is almost doomed to cliché.
But his own act, in 1972 Las Vegas, was not cliché.
Similarly, cliché is not sufficient for cheese. An eight-year-old
child at the school talent show might sing “Good Ship Lollipop”
and it would be, of course, cliché but not necessarily cheesy. If
the act included in addition lots of make-up and American
Idol-style over-singing and over-acting, then it would be
approaching cheesiness. But being simply cliché is not enough
to be cheesy. In fact, if Elvis had simply recycled his 1950s act
for the shows of  1970s Las Vegas, this would have been
preferable simply because it would have been merely cliché
and not cheesy, as well.
‘Showy’
Cheese can result from something’s being overly showy. There
is evidence that at one stage in the evolution of the term,
‘cheesy’ did just mean ‘showy’, descending ultimately from
“the big cheese.”[8]  But the two concepts have since
diverged. Memphis Elvis and Vegas Elvis are both showy, but
only the latter is cheesy. For that matter, the Taj Mahal is
showy but it’s not cheesy. Similarly, not everything cheesy is
showy. Neither Bobby Darin’s version of “Mack the Knife” nor
Sonny Rollins’ “Moriat,” based on the same tune, is particularly
showy, but only the former is cheesy.
One especially revealing and instructive use of the concept of
cheesiness I found while listening to a recent playoff series on
the radio. The announcer gleefully but, paradoxically, also
slightly peevishly charged that “Tonight the pitcher has been
painting the corners of the plate with cheese.” Here the term is
used to indicate a pitch that has an allure similar to that of a
specious argument. On the surface it looks good, but it is
misleadingly good-looking. In the end, it’s what leads to the
batter’s demise: “Struck him out with the high cheese!?”
3. Kitsch, Camp and Cheese
‘Kitsch’
If I give you a piece of kitsch art, perhaps as a gift or a joke,
what I give you is an inferior, tasteless copy which I know will
produce in you an easy sentimental response. But that’s not
necessarily a bad thing. It’s complicated. There is a
voluminous literature devoted to kitsch and kitsch art,[9] but
apparently, the term was used originally to refer to cheap and
sentimental imitative art, popular among the Nuevo Riche in
mid-to-late nineteenth century Munich. Over time the term
came to connote artwork of such poor construction, bad taste,
pretentiousness and, especially, melodramatic sentimentality,
as to be considered immoral.  At least this is the conclusion
drawn by Robert Solomon,
One of several suggested etymologies is that the word
is German for “smear” or “playing with mud,” and,
toying with this, we might speculate that the “mud” in
question is emotion and mucking around with emotions
inevitably makes a person “dirty.”[10]
We might level an obvious objection here, pointing to the fact
that lots of what goes by the name ‘kitsch’ is, although
certainly sentimental,  nevertheless sweet and harmless. Pink
Flamingoes, lava lamps and lawn jockeys are kitschy but,
surely, are not immoral.
There is a genuine dispute here. Some authors adhere to what
Deborah Knight calls “the standard view” that kitsch objects
are of such poor taste that they deserve our moral
derision.[11] Others attempt to deflate such claims, noting
either that there are value-neutral instances of sentimentality
or that there are genuinely morally laudable ones.[12] The
fulcrum of the dispute seems to be a matter, first, of the
magnitude of the sentiments involved and, second, the
manner and degree to which they are exploited for the
purposes of manipulation of the intended audience. The
complaint about kitsch art is that it traffics in reproduction,
sentiment and cliché, and that this makes its appeal purely
superficial, and potentially dangerous by making the audience
vulnerable to easy manipulation.[13] The purely superficial
appeal of kitschy objects, it is claimed, fails to engage the
intellect in the way needed for genuine art-appreciation. Of
course kitsch art and kitsch art-appreciation are not much
concerned with non-aesthetic but art-relevant properties—
things like originality and genius. As kitsch-object, a pink
flamingo purchased at Wal-Mart for $5 is just as good—just as
valuable—as one handmade by Picasso.[14]
Because cheese is similarly wrapped-up in sentimentality,
reproduction and cliché, an analogous and equally genuine
dispute arises in the case of cheesy art. But cheese and kitsch
are not the same thing. ‘Kitsch’ can be used as a term of
aesthetic approval, as when applied to works of art that
embrace the sentimentality for what it is. I might complain
about the Velvet Elvis above your fireplace: “Why do you have
that horrible, tacky thing up there? I thought you had good
taste.” You might correct me: “No, it’s kitschy; I love it.” But
‘cheese’ is a derogatory term. After I complain about your
Velvet Elvis, “What’s that horrible tacky thing doing up there?”
it would be a misuse of the concept to reply, “No, it’s cheesy;
I love it.”[15]
So something can be kitschy but not cheesy. The Velvet Elvis
on the dorm room wall, the lawn jockey in the front yard, the
garden gnome in the back yard, the studiously retro décor in
the corner café are some examples. Similarly one and the
same thing might be cheesy but not kitschy. Pick-up lines are
like this. The music of Kenny G is another good example.
Although unquestionably cheesy, Kenny G is way too uncool to
be kitschy; someone might collect Kenny G music as a joke
but not for its kitsch value.
To pick a different example, of course the music of Dean
Martin is or was at one time very popular, and a great number
of people actually listen to it deliberately and for the purpose
of enjoyment. Isn’t that a counterexample to the claim that
‘cheesy’ is a derogatory term? No. The distinction with
kitschiness supplies the difference. A person can enjoy kitschy
art while at the same time recognizing that it is kitschy. But no
one simultaneously enjoys cheesy art while recognizing that it
is cheesy. If they thought it was cheesy, they wouldn’t enjoy
it. The claim is simply that no one simultaneously enjoys and
judges as cheesy, say, Dean Martin’s “Volare”-- although one
might find it kitschy and enjoy it that way.
But mightn’t someone enjoy an artwork despite its cheesiness?
What then? It is common to say things like, “I know it’s a little
cheesy, but I still love it…” But this is not a counterexample
either. Something’s being a little cheesy doesn’t make it
cheesy. My grandmother is a good person even though she
speeds occasionally. Nobody’s perfect.
One possible suggestion is that cheese is unintended kitsch. In
other words, the claim would be that cheese is tacky,
unoriginal, tasteless, sentimental art that is intended to be
refined, original, tasteful and intellectually engaging art. There
is something correct here, but although cheese involves a
failed intention, this failure is not itself enough to make
something cheesy. If it were enough, then all cases of failed
art would be cases of cheese, and this conclusion is surely too
strong.
This fits with Milan Kundera’s famous remark about kitsch:
Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The
first tear says: How nice to see children running on the
grass! The second tear says: How nice to be moved,
together with all mankind, by children running on the
grass! It is the second tear that makes kitsch
kitsch.[16]
This does suggest an analogy or a least a similarity with
cheese, but cheese is not mere sentimentality, not even a
complex, self-reflexive sentimentality. Cheese lacks an
authenticity present in kitsch. Kitsch is sincere, whereas
cheese involves a kind of insincerity in that it aspires to a level
of appreciation it does not warrant.[17] So cheese cannot
simply be unintended kitsch. That way of thinking about it gets
the intention wrong. Cheese arises not from a lack of
intention, but rather from a failed intention. Success or failure,
of course, depends upon the receptivity of an audience. Thus,
for example, whether a pick-up line is cheesy or not depends
at least in part on the receptivity of the audience. Similarly,
much of the dialogue in the recent teen book and movie
sensation Twilight can be understood this way.
For similar reasons, the accordion music of Weird Al Jankovic
is kitschy but not cheesy. Although it is unoriginal, unsubtle
and showy, it is too self-aware to count as cheesy, and the
intention is not right. The intention is subtle and self-aware,
involving the equally self-aware, winking complicity of the
audience, neither of which is involved in deceptive
inauthenticity.
Not all cheese is kitsch. Hair Metal from the 1980s is cheesy
but not kitschy. Hair Metal trades in the “power ballad”
designed to produce sentimentality of the amorphous sexual
desire variety. It does produce in its audience an authentic
response, as intended, and so its intention succeeds to this
extent. There is nothing intrinsically cheesy about grown men
sharing in the production and consumption of such sentiments,
but when it is for an audience composed chiefly of teenage
girls, the result is pure cheese -- creamy Velveeta.
‘Camp’
Many consider Hollywood and Broadway musicals paradigm
cases of either kitsch or cheese. All of that overly-cheery
singing and dancing and over-acting, the melodrama, the
gaudy wardrobes, the ever-so-clever lyrics are really all too
much to bear, and so people often consider the result cheesy
or kitschy. But they are typically wrong. Similarly, Ru Paul’
outlandishly over the top drag queen act is neither kitschy nor
cheesy, although it shares many of the elements of both. It
certainly shares the winking self-awareness of certain kitschy
acts like Weird Al Yankovic’s parodic accordion playing, and
Paul’s studious frivolity resembles in those respects Gene
Simmons’ spectacularly cheesy blood-spitting KISS routine.
But in other ways Paul’s act itself, the audience’s response to
it, and the intentions and expectations involved are distinct
from those involved in kitsch and cheese. Paul’s act is more
accurately described as “camp”.
As with kitsch, there is a voluminous literature devoted to
camp[18], but the locus classicus of camp literature is Susan
Sontag’s “Notes on ‘Camp’.”[19]
Camp is a certain mode of aestheticism. It is one way of
seeing the world as an aesthetic phenomenon. That
way, the way of Camp, is not in terms of beauty, but in
terms of the degree of artifice, of stylization.[20]
The essence of Camp is its love of the unnatural: artifice
and exaggeration.[21]
Camp arises when “we can enjoy, instead of be
frustrated by, the failure of the attempt” to create
something serious or of high-quality.[22]
Many examples of Camp are things which, from a
“serious” point of view, are either bad art or kitsch.[23]
The ultimate camp statement: It’s good because it’s
awful.[24]
Camp results from the presentation of what appeals to naïve,
wholesome, middle-class sensibilities but in a way that
exhibits an exaggerated degree of artifice, stylization, and
extravagance, or even grandiosity to the point of frivolity.
Camp sensibility involves the love of all of this.  Thus it
requires, importantly, authenticity.  But it also involves the
appreciation of a dual-effect generated: the over-theaticalized
earnestness makes way for an ironic sensibility. Campy
performance thus involves a wry self-awareness, a winking at
the audience who winks back: It’s good because it’s so bad. In
this way, camp both enjoys and employs the gaudy and the
flamboyant.
Camp sees everything in quotation marks. It’s not a
lamp, but a “lamp;” not a woman, but a “woman.”[25]
The best examples of camp, according to Sontag, come from
Rococo and Art Nouveau styles[26] that employ the
appropriate high degree of artifice and exaggeration. They are,
she says, cases of “pure” camp, which tend to be more
satisfying than the “deliberate” variety because of their
naïveté.
The pure examples of Camp are unintentional; they are dead
serious.[27]
Of course, not all seriousness that fails can be redeemed as
Camp. Only that which has the proper mixture of the
exaggerated, the fantastic, the passionate, and the naïve.[28]
Classical works of the art nouveau genre are “dead serious,”
and the camp effect achieved is more pronounced when the
artist is working earnestly but producing camp unintentionally.
Sontag here is not making a conceptual claim about camp but
is simply making a psychological observation: better examples
of camp are produced unintentionally when the performers or
artists are utterly serious. It is a seriousness that fails in its
pretentions to greatness but succeeds, unintentionally, in
producing something that can be appreciated in a wholly
different way: as campy marginalia.[29]
This claim about the respective qualities of pure and deliberate
camp may not hold up forty years after the publication of
“Notes on ‘Camp’”. Consider the Australian sitcom, Kath &
Kim, which has already become something of a camp cult-
classic. Its over-the-top parody of suburban middle class life
in all of its lovable hypocrisy is pure camp fun.  It is clearly
intended to be such and it can only be truly appreciated as
campy satire. But it is nevertheless camp of the highest
quality and it produces the most satisfying effect. Further
examples of high-quality deliberate camp are easy to find.
Steven Cohan makes the case that the classical MGM musicals
starring Judy Garland are both textbook examples of camp and
deliberately produced as such.[30] Cohan’s claim, though not
uncontestable, is certainly plausible.[31] And it is not really
that important anyway: in distinguishing between “pure” and
“deliberate” camp, Sontag is not making a conceptual claim
but is, instead, dividing up the evidence from empirical cases
and drawing some evaluative conclusions.
In any case, camp is not to be confused with cheese.
Something can be campy without being cheesy. Again,
although many elitist-types might be inclined to dismiss
Broadway musicals like Hairspray as exercises in cheese, this
would be a mistake because these productions are more
properly understood and appreciated for their campy
celebration of their own awfulness . Similarly, no one would
mistake Monty Python’s “Camp Square-Bashing” sketch,
another camp cult-classic, for an instance of cheese, although
no one mistakes it for high art either. Conversely, something
can be cheesy without being campy. The recent Baz Luhrmann
film, Australia, starring Nicole Kidman and Hugh Jackman,
offers an interesting illustration. Its cheesy CGI backgrounds,
just part of that film’s overall failed attempt to produce a
grand epic on the scale of Gone with the Wind, does not result
in camp. It is a failed attempt at seriousness which, although it
does have a mixture of the exaggerated, the fantastic, the
passionate and the naïve, nevertheless fails as camp, and
results instead merely in cheese. Even Hugh Jackman’s softly
lit, soapy, rippling-muscled shower scene fails as camp and
simply adds to the net cheese effect. Similarly, the Sean
Daniel and James Jacks cheese vehicle, The Mummy series, is
an exercise in cheese. It is enjoyable cheese, to be sure, but
not intellectually charged enough or flamboyant in the right
way to count as campy.
‘Cheese’
Cheese, then, is closely related to but is distinct from both
kitsch and camp. Unlike ‘kitsch,’ ‘cheese’ is a derogatory term,
and cheesiness, unlike kitschiness, involves a failed intention
to move an audience in a certain way. Cheese, like camp, is
bad. But unlike camp, cheese is inauthentic and manipulative,
in that it attempts to pass off its badness as something good,
which it is not. Camp, although it certainly dwells in the land
of complicated and multiple levels of meaning, does not suffer
from this kind of inauthenticity. Thus some cheese can be seen
as failed camp.
As I mentioned earlier, there is evidence that the current
sense of the term ‘cheese’ derives from the expression ‘the big
cheese,’ whose source ultimately is the Persian or Hindi word
‘chiz’.[32]
Originally it had nothing to do with cheese — the source
is the Persian or Hindi word chiz, meaning a thing. Sir
Henry Yule wrote it up in Hobson-Jobson, his famous
Anglo-Indian Dictionary of 1886. He said that the
expression “used to be common among Anglo-Indians”
and cites expressions such as “My new Arab is the real
chiz” and “These cheroots are the real chiz.” Another
expression with the same meaning that predated the
real chiz was the real thing, so it’s highly probable that
Anglo-Indians changed thing to chiz as a bilingual joke.
Once returnees from India started to use it in Britain,
hearers naturally enough converted the unfamiliar
foreign word into something more recognizable, and it
became cheese.
The phrase big cheese developed from it in early
twentieth-century America, as a term to describe the
most influential or important person in a group. The first
written example we know about is in Ring Lardner’s
Haircut of 1914. It followed on several other American
phrases containing big to describe a person of this kind,
most with animal or vegetable associations — big bug,
big potato, big fish and big toad, of which the oldest is
probably the British English bigwig of the eighteenth
century (more recent examples are big shot, big
enchilada and big banana). Like the others, big cheese
was by no means always complimentary and often had
derisive undertones, no doubt helped along by the
influence of other slang meanings of cheese.[33]
Among the latter are ‘cheesed off,’ ‘cheesed,’ ‘cheesy grin’ and
‘cut the cheese.’ Especially important for the present
discussion, there is also evidence that the practice of saying
‘cheese’ when posing for photographs indicates the
disingenuousness of a forced smile:  a ‘cheesy grin.’[34]
Let us now gather some examples of cheese as the concept is
used in contemporary popular culture. Bobby Darin’s “Mack the
Knife”, but not Sonny Rollins’ “St. Thomas”; Pat Boone’s but
not Little Richard’s “Tutti Frutti”; Mario Lanza’s “O Sole Mio”;
just about anything by Kenny G but just about nothing by John
Coltrane; The Mummy series; pick-up lines; 1980s Hair Metal
(to which 1990s Grunge is a backlash); at least some of 1940s
and ‘50s West Coast Jazz (to which 1950s and ‘60s Hard Bop is
a backlash); Barbara Walters television specials; “You had me
at hello”; “I can’t live without you”; “You complete me”; Dean
Martin; pandering political speeches and commercials. What do
these have in common? Here is an attempt at capturing the
concept:
Cheese is lacking in originality, subtlety, and authenticity,
often showy to the point of showing-off, with the aim to
induce an original, subtle and authentic response in an
audience, but where the intention typically fails in that the
response induced is typically unoriginal, unsubtle, and
inauthentic, such as cheap sentimentality or pathos.
One might object: ‘cheese’ is not necessarily derogatory. Some
of the dialog in the recent book and movie Twilight, for
example, can only be called cheesy, and yet it is endearing of
the characters nonetheless. “Sure it’s cheesy, but in a good
way.” This is wrong. Either the dialog is merely sentimental
but not cheesy at all, and our speaker simply means to say
that it is sentimental but in a good way, or else it is cheesy
and bad for this reason, but its badness is overwhelmed by
something else, such as how adorable the person uttering the
cheesy lines is. Cheesy dialog might be forgivable if delivered
by a dreamboat, especially for a teenage audience. His
dreaminess more than compensates for his cheesiness.
So why is Dean Martin cheesy and Frank Sinatra not, even
though the two belong to one and the same musical and
performance genre and share not some small number of
similarities, including a fan base? By now the answer should
be quite apparent. Dean Martin aims for but fails to achieve
the level of originality subtlety and authenticity achieved in
Sinatra’s best works, even though Dean Martin employs similar
performance techniques, works in similar musical styles and
affects a similar persona.
Another objection will be raised by anti-intentionalists, who are
loathe to incorporate intentions into interpretive aesthetic
assessments. For example, one might object: How can cheese
arise from a failed intention?  Surely Celine Dion succeeds in
producing what she intends, for her audience responds
appropriately by being moved in just the way intended. The
flamboyant stroke of the air guitar sends the audience into
rapturous delight. The intention succeeds yet the act is still
cheesy.
I have more to say about this below, but for now it is enough
simply to point out that our judgments about cheese require
that the thing judged to be cheesy is judged also to involve a
failed intention in its production, just as we can’t judge that
someone is being pretentious or presumptuous without
assigning to that person a certain kind of intention. Similar
points can be made concerning how our judgments about
cheese involve historical or cultural contexts, as well as
background knowledge and experience of relevant categorial
facts having to do with, e.g., genre and style. I have more to
say about these later.
For now, it is important to at least make note of the culturally
specific nature of the concepts of cheese and cheesiness. In
this paper, I am concerned with an analysis of the concepts as
they are used in Western popular culture in the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries. It may be that use of the
concepts does not occur outside certain linguistic communities
or sub-communities whose range is restricted by various
geographical, economic, ethnic, or other factors. Something
like this is surely the case, and so for what follows one must
keep in mind that the discussion is culturally contextual in
these ways.[35] One rather clear example of the culturally
sensitive nature of “cheesiness” can be seen in the case of the
exaggerated overacting prevalent in Latin American
telenovelas. To North American viewers, the overacting
contributes to a cheesy effect, but presumably members of
Latin American audiences register no such response. This is all
as it should be.
Perhaps for something to be cheesy it not only has to be
considered bad by somebody, but it also has to be liked by
somebody, and in particular liked by somebody whom the
original somebody thinks has bad taste.  “Burt Reynold's porno
mustache?  It's so cheesy—I can't believe he thinks it's sexy!' 
“Kenny G is so cheesy—my mom listens to that stuff.” 
Perhaps these mean that when I label something cheesy, I'm
not only disparaging the work but also the people who like the
work.  This is all rather elitist, but none of it precludes my
occasionally letting out my inner teenage girl and enjoying the
special edition of Dirty Dancing, or singing along to “My Heart
Will Go On.” It just means that I can’t do so and consider it
cheesy at the same time.  More on this below.
The relational character of cheese and related concepts is
shared by other kinds of aesthetic concepts, as is made clear
from the discussions of kitsch and camp, above. Thus I do not
want to give the impression that the important roles of
historical-cultural context, artist’s intentions and audience
receptivity are unique to cheese. To the contrary: they are
shared by many fundamental aesthetic concepts.[36] What I
hope to do here is to show, rather, how the concept of cheese
provides a good illustration and a test case for various debates
in contemporary aesthetics.
4. Some Theoretical Points About Who Cares
Intentionalism and anti-intentionalism
Cheesy art provides examples that help to illustrate the
debate between intentionalists and anti-intentionalists, or
what Stephen Davies calls “value maximizers.”[37] With his
highly influential work, “Categories of Art,” Kendall Walton
convinced many aestheticians that proper art interpretation
requires that artworks be perceived or experienced under the
right categories.[38] He claimed further, and quite plausibly,
that it is sometimes the case that artist’s intentions supply
some of these categories. Call such intentions “categorial
intentions.” One fairly uncontroversial example of such an
interpretation-determining categorial intention is simply the
“for-public-consumption” intention, which is the artist’s
intention to produce an artifact for public appreciation. Other
interpretation-determining categorial intentions might include
the intention to produce a work of one or another established
artistic category, such as the intention to produce a painting
rather than a sculpture, or prose rather than poetry.
Intentionalists and anti-intentionalists disagree about all of
this in various ways and to various levels of vexation.[39] Of
course, evaluative intentions aren’t allowed by either side,
since, for example, the mere intention to produce a great work
is presumably irrelevant to matters of interpretation. Without
attempting to resolve the debate here, I want to hold simply
that the intentionalist position is a viable candidate position,
and so any complaint that my account of cheesiness appeals
objectionably to artists’ intentions is off base.
Keeping this in mind, we can note that cheesy art is especially
ripe for parody. Whether Celine Dion’s “My Heart Will Go On”
counts as a powerful and emotional tour de force or a hilarious
send-up of sappy, sentimental movie soundtrack ballads
depends on the intentions, or at least the hypothetical
intentions,[40] of its performer. No one seriously maintains
that Celine Dion was intending to produce a self-parody with
her version of the song, and that interpretation should be
rejected. She intended, rather, to produce a heart-wrenching
power ballad. Such categorical intentions are relevant—
indispensible—to the interpretation of artworks because
categorial intentions help to fix the identity, and thus the
content, of the work.[41]  As Davies puts it, the interpretation
needs to be true to the work, not merely consistent with
it.[42] Of course an artist’s categorial intentions might fail, if
other requirements are not in place.
To illustrate what I have in mind, contrast Celine Dion’s
version of “My Heart Will Go On” with an instrumental version
of the same song performed by Los Straightjackets, a
Nashville band with a guitar-heavy style in the tradition of The
Ventures. The Los Straightjackets version begins, following
brief introductory sounds of lapping waves and a foghorn, with
a relatively reverential rendering of the melody on electric
guitar with tremolo effects, but then proceeds through a series
of ridiculous clichés, including over-dubbed string and choral
accompaniments, and one-string guitar solos employing
overuse of the guitar’s “whammy-bar” and needlessly
exaggerated reverb effects. The key then modulates upward
for dramatic effect as new parts are added to the mix,
including overdubbed and wholly gratuitous harp plucking and
absurdly dramatic organ grinding. There is a pause for a guitar
bridge done in a kind of 1960s style “rave up,” which is
followed immediately by a chorus of “aahs” that repeats the
main theme. All of this continues to build to a climactic
tympani-filled grand finale, followed by the bubbling, gurgling
sound of, evidently, the ship’s going down.
The Los Straightjackets version is obviously a send-up of a
cheesy movie theme song. But it is not itself a work of cheese,
despite the fact that it is composed entirely of a series of
cheesy clichés. It would be impossible to appreciate the Los
Straightjackets version of the tune without understanding that
it is a parody, and this categorial property is something fixed
by the intentions of the artists. Similarly, although the Celine
Dion version is much more enjoyable understood as a kind of
self-parody, this way of appreciating it is not really a way of
appreciating the work itself.
So we might reason as follows: for the debate between
intentionalists and anti-intentionalists, the tough cases involve
situations where differences in interpretation arise depending
on whether we are guided by our concern for the artist’s
intentions (actual or hypothetical) or by concern for maximal
artistic value. Cheesy art provides a host of easily
understandable examples from popular culture that make this
contrast particularly clear. Here are two of them:
The movie Australia, understood as a sweeping epic love story
in the tradition of Gone with the Wind, is facile, tedious and
rather embarrassing to watch, but understood as a self-
referential parody of such grandiose pretentions, is a hilarious
and biting satire that is rather enjoyable to watch. “My Heart
Will Go On,” performed by Los Straightjackets, is a painful
series of ridiculous clichés if heard as a reverential cover of the
Titanic theme song, but understood as parody, it is a masterful
employment of technical expertise and a brilliant send-up of a
popular culture icon.
Nevertheless, an anti-intentionalist might complain these are
simply cases in which the artists’ categorial intentions decide
the case by fixing the category to which the works belong, and
anti-intentionalists as well as intentionalists can agree on this
point.[43] This objection is somewhat off the mark, for the
intentions involved in works of cheese are importantly different
from those involved in the ordinary case. With cheesy art,
whether a categorial intention succeeds or not may still be
something that is audience-dependent. To see what I have in
mind, consider that there are further kinds of intentions
relevant to cheesy art production, beyond the categorial ones.
Especially important is the kind of intention that is involved in
trying too hard. This intention is at least part of what is
objectionable about pick-up lines and gold chains, and it is
part of what makes them cheesy. Similarly, what makes an
essential contribution to the cheesiness of Australia is that it is
so clearly trying too hard, aspiring to a greatness it can never
achieve. The same is true of another cheesy movie epic, Pearl
Harbor. In such cases, our assessments of artistic value cannot
escape reference to this kind of intention. Even the attribution
of a seemingly intrinsic aesthetic property such as gracefulness
can be influenced in the same way. Michael Brecker and John
Coltrane often differ with respect to gracefulness, despite the
fact that cheesy works of the former often incorporate non-
cheesy elements of the latter.
Of course all of this is, as it should be, largely subjective and
audience-relative. Production of cheesy art involves a failed
intention to produce something original, authentic and moving,
but the intention may fail only for the critically-inclined.
Consider what might be one of the great examples from the
history of cheese: the French cheesy art of Francisque Poulbot,
whose early twentieth century works include paintings of
weeping clowns and of little Parisian boys in rags, often
depicted peeing in the street as sign of cute misbehaving.[44]
Poulbot and other popular Montmartre artists of that time (the
practice disappeared with the 1960s) who painted weeping
clowns were driven by the idea that the paradox was
interesting, and these pictures did find their proper audience.
Thus, it is important to take into account the target audience
that does enjoy the object and finds it not cheesy but tasteful,
like American consumers of cheese whiz versus the foreign
cheese lover. But the fact that judgments about cheesiness
are always going to be audience-relative does not change the
fact that some of the intentions involved in the production of
cheesy art and essential to it are not merely categorial
intentions. At the very least, given the level of contention
between intentionalists and anti-intentionalists, it is not a
decisive objection to my account of cheesiness that it appeals
to artists’ intentions. Furthermore, cases of cheesiness in art
provide nice illustrations of some important points in the
debate between intentionalists and their opponents.
The naïve aesthetic theory of art
Cheesy art provides straightforward challenges to the naïve
aesthetic theory according to which artistically relevant
properties are determined by, or supervene on, aesthetic
properties. This is particularly interesting, as the naïve
aesthetic theory is the one held, implicitly, by the average
person on the street, and yet that same person easily grasps
the challenges that cheesy art presents for that theory.
Aesthetically identical works can differ with respect to a
variety of artistically relevant properties, including semantic
properties (reference and meaning) as well as certain
metaphysical properties (artistic category, art-historical
context, originality, forgery).[45]
Bill Murray’s cheesy lounge singer parody is a hilarious
mocking portrait of an imagined but aesthetically identical
performance that deserves our derision. We laugh at the one
but not at the other, or at least not in the same way or for the
same reasons. Murray pokes fun at an imagined performer
who is trying too hard and failing, but Murray is neither trying
too hard nor failing. One act but not the other is cheesy
because they differ in semantic content, despite the fact that
they are, we may suppose, aesthetically identical. So two
artworks may differ with respect to cheesiness and yet be
aesthetically identical. Making the same point in reverse, Ed
Wood’s Plan 9 from Outer Space, is a classic of sci-fi cheese,
not a brilliant send-up that cuts against the grain of Hollywood
norms.[46]
The paradox of negative art
Cheese provides some beautiful cases relevant to the paradox
of negative art,[47] generating what we might call “the
paradox of cheese.” Why, given its cringe-inducing properties,
does cheese attract such huge audiences? One obvious
solution would be to claim simply that a positive response
compensates for the negative response produced by
cheese.[48] After all, we might say, Pat Boone’s “Tutti Frutti”
has sufficient enjoyable qualities, aesthetic and non-aesthetic,
to overcome whatever cheesiness it exhibits. Similarly, the
target audience of Twilight might find something compensatory
in its response to the cheesy dialog in that book and movie
series. But this seems wrong: the palpable cheesiness of Pat
Boone’s rendition of “Tutti Frutti” surely overwhelms the rest.
Further, it would be implausible in the case of Celine Dion’s
several years of sold out shows in Vegas that the members of
her audience perceived any cheesiness at all.
However, a more sophisticated, or Eudemonian, account might
do: the negative response is genuine, we might say, but it is
part of a broader art appreciation picture involving deeper,
cognitively driven satisfactions beyond mere pleasure. But this
seems highly implausible in the case of cheesy art. It seems,
rather, that the attitudes of cheese-inclined audiences of
Twilight and Celine are better captured by the conversionary
account according to which the negative response is turned
into a positive one. It is not so much that the cheesiness is
overcome by other, more important qualities, but rather that it
disappears altogether. It is sort of like joining a benign cult:
given that no real harm is done, one converts. Upon
conversion, one learns to love Celine Dion. If this is right, then
the radical relativity of cheesiness becomes inescapable. The
artwork can remain the same in all of its cheese-relevant
properties and yet audiences will differ in their responses.
Enjoyment of horror films, which also have cringe-inducing
properties, albeit of a very different kind, might be explained
in a similar way.
Postmodernism
Finally, its ubiquity makes the concept of cheesiness an
interesting test-case for all kinds of aesthetic theories of
popular culture. In particular, what I’ve discussed about the
importance to cheesiness of the concepts ‘copy’ and
‘reproduction’ suggests implications for some themes of
postmodernist aesthetics. For example, Walter Benjamin, Jean
Baudrillard, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Umberto Eco, among
others, discuss a family of notions, including mechanical
reproduction,[49] the iterative and the repetitive, serial
production of tokens of one type,[50] sameness, and
simulacra.[51]
Importantly, the paradoxical combination of the ubiquity of
and aversion to cheese in popular culture appears to count
both for and against claims that originality, authenticity and
reality no longer guide aesthetic assessments in the
postmodern age. Ordinary use of the concept of cheesiness
exploits these very notions and their dialectical counterparts. It
is a concept impossible to apply without at least an implicit
understanding of the importance of these various distinctions.
Nor should it be claimed that the concept of cheese is simply a
holdover from hierarchical, elitist, and modernist pretentions.
Cheesiness doesn’t really have application inside elitist culture.
Vegas is the land of cheese, and the way to consume what it
has to offer is to inauthentically immerse oneself in the not-
so-expensive-but-not-so-cheap-either copies of real things,
both artifactual and natural, original and copy. Every day is a
veritable cheese-fest. And yet everyone knows this about
Vegas. It is an escapist paradise that no one would confuse
with the real thing. Someone might enjoy what Vegas has to
offer more than the real things themselves, but no one
confuses Vegas with the genuine article either; they just don’t
care. They’ve gone over to the cheese side.[52]
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